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New indicators to measure Biodiversity?  
Comparison of biodiversity offset programs implemented by two mining companies in 
Madagascar 
 
 
Summary 
In this article we examine the institutional strategies and methods of biodiversity offset 
calculation employed by two mining companies in Madagascar. Much like the REDD+ 
mechanisms, these environmental projects are based on past estimations and future 
predictions, and require validation by international experts. They incorporate a set of 
standard indicators adapted to the affected habitats, and specially developed units of 
measurement to demonstrate equivalence. The complex and diverse mitigation portfolios of 
these companies include aspects of both in-kind and financial compensation, and allow the 
combination of different types of programs that may be developed directly by the company or 
delegated to conservation non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
Beyond scientific innovations and institutional strategies, the question remains whether or not 
these mechanisms will lead to new paradigms and players in conservation or simply become 
incorporated into existing schemes developed by conservation NGOs and national park 
authorities. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
As a means for grouping various types of biodiversity offset mechanism under an academic 
definition, three criteria appear to be particularly relevant: “(1) they provide additional 
substitution or replacement for unavoidable negative impacts of human activity on 
biodiversity, (2) they involve measurable, comparable biodiversity losses and gains, and (3) 
they demonstrably achieve, as a minimum, no net loss of biodiversity. » (Bull, Suttle, Gordon, 
Singh, & Milner-Gulland, 2013, p371). This definition illustrates the important scientific issues 
surrounding these mechanisms which must demonstrate, substitute, and measure their 
positive as well as negative impacts. 
Thus, biodiversity offsets depend on scientific argumentation to show that the impacts 
generated by environmentally intrusive projects are equivalent or less than environmental 
benefits proposed by the same projects. The need to demonstrate equivalence means that 
these mechanisms involve the deployment of scientists and experts as well as the 
development of indicators and metrics suitable for biodiversity measurement. Since the 
unique aspects of biodiversity can vary greatly from one site to another, biodiversity units are 
not as easily defined as the measurement of carbon tonnage (ten Kate, Bishop, & Bayon, 
2004); and they require studies to compare biodiversity between different sites and to 
measure (as far as possible) the negative and positive impacts of a project. 
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Although this new practice is not compulsory in many jurisdictions, it advances actors’ 
interests, and presents advantages such as providing companies with a reinforced “licence to 
operate”, enhancing reputations, and facilitating acquisition of loans with development banks 
(as explained since 1988 in IFC performance standards or stipulated in the Equator 
Principles) (ten Kate et al., 2004). Early adoption and proactive participation by companies 
translates into improved understanding of international policy processes and access to 
technical guidance in this rapidly evolving field. The two mining companies in Madagascar 
chose to develop offset programs relatively early and were among the first case studies of 
the Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP) (Kirsten, 2007), an international 
platform working to promote international best practice in biodiversity offsets. 
The offset strategies being developed around the world are diverse in terms of governance, 
calculations, collaborations, and even regarding main objectives. The programs of the two 
companies in Madagascar covered in our study reflect slightly differing objectives; the 
principal goal of Ambatovy (following the BBOP model) is to deliver “no net loss, preferably a 
net gain” of biodiversity, while QMM seeks to achieve a “net positive impact” on biodiversity. 
Beyond the precise use of terminology, these two projects involve different sets of actors and 
different calculation methods. What are the strategies developed by these companies to 
offset the residual environmental impacts caused by their extraction activity? How is this 
newly manifested interest in conservation by mining companies being institutionalized and 
advocated? What are the methods used to demonstrate the equivalence between losses and 
gains? How are these schemes acquiring credibility? 
Through a description of the institutional and methodological strategies used by these two 
firms operating in a country recognized as a “hotspot” of biodiversity, we intend to highlight 
and explore some of the central issues associated with this new mechanism. 
 
2. Theoretical background 
This paper falls into the field of science and technology, and more precisely in the co-
production of a scientific and societal framework which allows the symmetrical analysis of 
social context and scientific construction: "Science, in the co-productionist framework, is 
understood as neither a simple reflection of the truth about nature nor an epiphenomenon of 
social and political interests. Rather, co-production is symmetrical in that it calls attention to 
the social dimensions of cognitive commitments and understandings, while at the same time 
underscoring the epistemic and material correlates of social formations. Co-production can 
therefore be seen as a critique of the realist ideology that persistently separates the domains 
of nature, facts, objectivity, reason and policy from those of culture, values, subjectivity, 
emotion and politics." (Jasanoff, 2004, p3) 
This framework builds on the work of Foucault, who called attention to the links between 
knowledge and power (Foucault, 1975), and by consequence between science and politics. 
This understanding facilitates insight into how environmental science and its evolution are 
woven into political debate and social context (Forsyth, 2003). The concept of biodiversity 
offsets is imbued with political and economic issues, but scientific argumentation is essential 
to earn legitimacy as a compensation instrument. Within this context we hypothesize that 
institutional arrangements, and social issues are just as influential as the ecosystem and 
4 
 
science in this process. We will apply this co-productionist framework to biodiversity offsets 
developed in Madagascar, and detail the choices of governance and methodology used by 
two companies in order to demonstrate the links between institutional arrangements and 
scientific knowledge. 
Offsets can be broadly classified into three general types (Geraldine Froger & Ménard, 
submitted): 
- ‘In-kind’ offsets are projects developed by the company to establish the ecological 
equivalence between losses and gains resulting from its activities to demonstrate the 
final goal of “no net loss” or “net positive impact”. 
- ‘Financial offsets are conservation programs financed by the company but 
implemented by contractors, such as an NGO. The company delegates the 
responsibility of performance and the program is externally assessed with more 
emphasis given to the company’s financial contribution than on ecological 
equivalence. 
- Biodiversity Banking is a system based on a supply of biodiversity units, with an 
intermediary acting between the mining company and the conservation program 
manager. 
In describing the two case studies, we will identify each company by category, and explore 
their choice of strategy.  
 
3. Methodology and case studies 
This article was written during a three-month study for the European project Invaluable. It is 
rooted in social science methodologies: document reviews, semi-direct interviews, and direct 
observations in the offset zones of the two mining companies. After describing the national 
context, we will introduce the case studies. 
 
3.1. National context 
Madagascar is a biodiversity hotspot country engaged in the protection of natural resources 
with an environmental program first developed in the 1980s and since supported by 
international donors and conservation NGOs (G. Froger & Meral, 2012). Besides its 
biological resources, the country possesses mining resources representing a major 
economic opportunity for the development of the country, among the poorest in the world. 
Two international mining companies are working in Madagascar (see the annex for their 
main characteristics) and their activities should provide 18% of the fiscal revenues of the 
country by 2018 (Pelon, 2010). The mining code adopted in 1999 with the help of World 
Bank was intended to better regulate mining and encourage responsible mining investment 
(Sarrasin, 2006). 
The activities of these mining companies still represent social and environmental risks 
(Sarrasin, 2006) and may have irreversible impacts (Les amis de la Terre France, 2012; 
Waeber, 2012). However, following international rules, and with a professed will to go 
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beyond those rules, these two international companies are developing environmental 
programs to compensate impacts to Malagasy forests incurred by their mining activities. 
Being at the same time a biodiversity hotspot and an economically and institutionally weak 
state, Madagascar remains a priority country for actors of environmental conservation. As 
demonstrated among NGOs’ activities, the Malagasy government is relatively weak 
compared to other countries, leaving more room for the political manoeuvring useful for 
developing projects (Hrabanski, Bidaud, Le Coq, & Méral, 2013). The perpetual research of 
funding for conservation leads those actors to diversify their sources of funding especially 
through the promoting new approaches such as the conservation of ecosystem services 
(Bidaud et al., 2013). Biodiversity offsets also represent an opportunity to attract new 
investment by showcasing the consequential expansion of national protected area systems 
as a conservation success (Corson, 2011). 
 
3.2. Case studies 
3.2.1. QMM and Rio Tinto 
QIT Madagascar Minerals (QMM) is a subsidiary of Rio Tinto (20% is owned by the 
Malagasy government) implanted in the South East of Madagascar. The objective is ilmenite 
exploitation, a source of titanium dioxide which is used as a whitener in numerous industrial 
products. The ilmenite is found under littoral sands at a depth of about 12 meters. Three 
sites, Mandena, Petriky, and Sainte Luce, are planned for exploitation in a perimeter of 40 
km near the south-eastern town of Fort Dauphin. These three sites encompass littoral forests 
which are more or less degraded but which exhibit high biodiversity and levels of endemism, 
and are the principal subject of the impact studies and biodiversity offsets. 
QMM has been involved in Madagascar since 1986 and completed an initial environmental 
and social impact study in 1992. QMM acquired the environmental permits for Mandena in 
2001, and exploitation began at the end of 2008. The initial investments are estimated at 
around 931 million USD. The exploitation is expected to continue for 40 years from first 
production. 
 
3.2.2. Ambatovy and BBOP 
Ambatovy is an enterprise exploiting laterite ores to produce nickel, cobalt and ammonium 
sulphate. The company undertakes both extraction and processing of the ore, the first such 
project in Madagascar and also relatively rare in Africa (QMM’s raw material is sent to 
Canada to be transformed into product). The mine exploitation and the first 2km of the 
pipeline transporting the ore to the factory require cutting humid forest including forest at the 
edge of a site designated by Madagascar under the Ramsar convention, making the activity 
a prime candidate for a best practice biodiversity offset approach. 
The environmental permit was awarded in 2006, construction began in 2007, operations in 
2010, and commercial production in 2014. The investment to date amounts to about 7 billion 
USD. The project is expected to operate over a 29 year period. 
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The two companies have recently developed biodiversity offset programs and represent 
interesting comparative case studies to examine actors’ strategies and approaches to the 
mitigation of impacts on biodiversity and methods for quantifying losses and gains. 
 
4. Offset calculation and  institutional arrangements 
4.1. Similar collaborative strategies 
Rio Tinto and Ambatovy create partnerships with different actors, but use a similar strategy 
to develop offset methodology, validate it, and implement conservation projects. 
By 1998 Rio Tinto recognized the importance of considering environmental factors to better 
manage operations and improve access to land (Rio Tinto, 1998). In 1994 the company 
established a global strategy for biodiversity (Rio Tinto, 2004) which was launched during the 
IUCN World Congress in Bangkok, and further detailed in a 2008 document (Rio Tinto, 
2008). 
The Net Positive Impact strategy “means minimizing the impacts of our business and 
contributing to biodiversity conservation to ensure a region ultimately benefits as a result of 
our presence." (Rio Tinto 2008, p2). 
This strategy was first tested through a conservation program on several sites in 
Madagascar. It is likely that Rio Tinto’s choice to work on conservation in Madagascar has 
various reasons. First of all, the ilmenite ore is found under littoral forest with high biodiversity 
value (Bollen & Donati, 2006; Du Puy & Moat, 1996; Ganzhorn, Lowry II, Shatz, & S., 2001), 
and thus the site represents a very pertinent place to test a biodiversity program. 
Additionally, campaigns against this mining project emerged in the 1990s (Friends of the 
Earth, World Development Movement and London Zoo), eventually forcing the company to 
establish, in 1996, a conservation and environment team (Olegario, Harvey, & Mueller, 
2012).  
Rio Tinto seems to see the offset program as an opportunity to be showcased as the 
worldwide leader in environmental issues for extractive industries: “The outcomes of these 
added benefits are beginning to differentiate us from our competitors and are helping us 
move towards our goal of being the undisputed sector leader in maximizing value to 
stakeholders” (Rio Tinto, 2007 cited by Kirsten, 2007).  
After joining forces with BBOP during the development of this offset strategy, Rio Tinto then 
preferred to proceed with its own methodology estimating itself to be more advanced in 
addressing the issues of this new platform. The strategy of the company was to team up with 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) through a 3-year collaboration 
agreement signed in 2010. Two documents have been written (Olsen, Bishop, & Anstee, 
2011; Temple et al., 2012); one of them describes the methodology and results of 
biodiversity quantification on exploitation and conservation zones (Temple et al. 2012), and 
the other is an economic valuation of protected forests by QMM (but will not be described 
here). 
The main report presenting the scientific argumentation of the Net Positive Impact strategy 
was written by The Biodiversity Consultancy Ltd. of Cambridge, UK, with support from the 
environment team of QMM. It has been presented to the biodiversity committee and revised, 
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and then reviewed by several experts from diverse institutions: Hamburg University, Sussex 
University, Fauna & Flora International, Royal Botanic Gardens Kew, IUCN, UNEP-WCMC, 
Birdlife International, Conservation international, Wildlife Conservation Society, NatureServe. 
Twenty-eight people participated in the drafting and the validation of the document. 
The strategy is based on a mitigation portfolio: 3 offset zones of forest (2 like-for-like and 1 
like-for-not-like), the restoration of exploitation zones, and the avoidance of exploitation. This 
portfolio is managed by the QMM environment team for some sites (although QMM aims to 
transfer management progressively to the local community), and by conservation NGOs for 
other sites. Until now, conservation and restoration zones around the exploitation sites have 
been managed by QMM while other forests are supervised by conservation NGOs like 
Missouri Botanical Garden (MBG) and Asity Madagascar (Birdlife International).  
By developing its own conservation and restoration programs, but also financing 
conservation NGOs for the development of specific programs, QMM demonstrates a strategy 
that includes both in-kind compensation and financial offset. The accounting methods of both 
programs use the same units of measurement (as described in the following section). 
 
Similarly, in the Ambatovy case we find private sector experts, participation in an 
international platform, and a portfolio of actions developed by Ambatovy teams or in 
partnership with NGOs. 
The document describing the Ambatovy environmental strategy was written in 2009 by Pierre 
Berner (Ambatovy), Steven Dickinson (Golder Associates) and Aristide Andrianarimisa 
(WCS), and takes inspiration from the social and environmental impact study written by 
Dynatec and Golder Associates in 2006 (Dynatec Corporation of Canada, 2006). The 
document outlines an accounting method for biodiversity compensation sites that follows 
BBOP guidelines, and presents a portfolio of environmental responses to mining activities. 
The portfolio, much like that of QMM, includes a diverse array of ecosystems with programs 
of mitigation or avoidance, conservation, restoration, and reforestation. These include the 
Ankerana offset (like-for-like), 3 conservation zones of forest around the mine, restoration of 
the forest corridor to ensure connectivity, support to the conservation of a Ramsar wetland, 
reforestation along a section of the pipeline and on the mine footprint, and a program of 
mitigation before clearance of forest lots. The sites are managed by Ambatovy in 
collaboration with other NGOs including CI (which is the delegated manager of the 
Ankeniheny-Zahamena forest corridor (CAZ) of which the Ankerana forest is part) or MBG 
which conducted research and conservation of endangered flora by mining activities 
(Ambatovy, 2012). This offset strategy has been cited as an example at the international 
level (ICMM, 2010). 
 
Despite different sets of actors, we see similar biodiversity strategies in both case studies: 
offset portfolio diversification, scientific collaboration with international experts, association 
with well-known organisations or platforms (IUCN for QMM, BBOP for Ambatovy), local 
partnership with NGOs and research organisations, and conservation and restoration 
programs managed by the company itself. This diversification of projects and the 
collaborations improve the company’s credibility in the environmental field, multiplies the 
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chances of successful offset projects and buffers against the effect of individual project 
failures. The diversity of actions also diffuses radical critics. But even though these strategies 
may add legitimacy to the companies’ biodiversity offset programme, that same diversity also 
complicates implementation. 
 
4.2. Similar base but different methods 
The accounting methods used by QMM and Ambatovy for calculating biodiversity are largely 
based on the same system of measurement: habitat hectares. 
Habitat hectares is a metric developed in Australia by the State Government of Victoria to 
assess the quantity and quality of vegetation through the evaluation of two main 
determinants: site condition and viability of patch vegetation. This quantitative method uses a 
standardised approach to assign individual scores (adjusted to an assigned weight 
differential) on 10 habitat indicators. Scores are then combined (with a differentiate 
contribution) to obtain an estimation of the quality of the habitat on a scale from 0 (total loss) 
to 1 (complete rehabilitation or 100% of “natural quality” as represented by an established 
“benchmark”) (Parkes, Newell, & Cheal, 2003; Victorian Government, 2002). The habitat 
hectares method has been criticized by McCarthy et al. (2004) for several reasons: potential 
error among various in-the-field assessments, a lack of consideration given to disturbance 
regimes, apparent internal inconsistencies and ill-defined procedures. Parkes and his 
colleagues answer these criticisms by reiterating the rationality of the method which offers a 
simple, understandable, and useful measure for managers (Parkes, Newell, & Cheal, 2004). 
Despite the criticisms, the habitat hectare is widely used by companies as a metric in loss-
gain calculations. 
Both mining companies studied in this article adopted the concept of the habitat hectare 
method in large part for its simplicity, but they each modified the methodology to their own 
specifications. BBOP adjusted this method for its pilot projects (Business and Biodiversity 
Offsets Programme (BBOP), 2012a). In the Ambatovy case, 10 indicators of fauna and flora 
(table below) are evaluated to determine the hectare quality of the principal offset site. This 
methodology assessing ten indicators assumes a high degree of similarity between 
exploitation and conservation sites. The 2009 publication developed this method but a lack of 
data restricted its complete application, preventing conclusive calculations to prove the 
achievement of the no net loss objective. Since 2009, three scientific expeditions involving 
approximately one hundred researchers were conducted in 2010, 2011, and 2012 in order to 
collect additional data for more complete loss gain calculations (Ambatovy, 2013). A fourth 
expedition was undertaken in 2014, and the expeditions should provide enough data for 
Ambatovy to publish results in the near future (Andrew Cooke, pers. comm.).  
 
The compensation principle developed by QMM contends that even in the absence of mining 
operations, the littoral forest would have been destroyed by the pressure of human activity 
from the local population. From this perspective they suggest that the restoration and 
conservation programs, developed by the company will bring a net positive impact on 
biodiversity at the regional level. To support this argumentation quantitatively, IUCN, The 
Biodiversity Consultancy and the environment team of Rio Tinto used two metrics: “Quality 
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Hectare” and “Units of Global Distribution” which are both conceptually linked to the habitat 
hectares method developed by the State of Victoria. 
“Quality hectare” illustrates forest degradation in terms of quantity and quality of the forest 
cover (Temple et al., 2012, p16). Using the forest cover as the only indicator (as opposed to 
10 different indicators) considerably simplifies the method, and does not require a high 
degree of similarity between the exploitation and conservation sites. 
“Units of Global Distribution” is a metric developed specifically for the Madagascar project, 
but is also linked to quality hectares, and inspired by identification methods for biodiversity 
conservation’s globally important sites under the Ramsar Convention1. This metric is also 
linked to the extinction risk of the IUCN list. The units are calculated according to the 
presence of species and their global distribution: one unit corresponds to 1% of the global 
population of the species. The endemicity of the species is reflected in calculations to ensure 
that Units of Global Distribution can account for impacts on a rare species. The species can 
be different from one site to another; importance is placed on the consideration of all the 
species and their rarity2. 
The two metrics allow the evaluation of different types of ecosystems as well as the forest 
conservation activities developed by QMM and its partners, thus enabling offset comparisons 
to the biodiversity lost on exploited sites. 
 
Around 10 methods of offset calculation exist in the world (Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP), 2012a, 2012b). In our case studies we have seen that the two 
companies exploiting ore in Madagascar apply methodologies that are based on the same 
metric (habitat hectare), but calculate it differently. QMM simplifies the method by using only 
two indicators, thus allowing them to compare a variety of habitats and compensate for the 
diminished surface of littoral forests, which is too small to be the only offset. Ambatovy more 
or less follows the original habitat hectare method, using a similar grid of 10 indicators 
(depending of the presence of certain species) for degraded and conserved forest. As noted, 
this requires strong habitat similarity, which additional studies are intended to confirm. 
Neither of the methodologies used by the two companies are transformative biological 
studies. They remain focused on standard species indicators (population numbers and IUCN 
classification) and the study of forest cover to describe habitat degradation. They are 
variations on the habitat hectare method developed by the government of Victoria in 2002. 
The concept of Ecosystem Services has been on the international conservation agenda for a 
decade (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005) but it has not yet been integrated with 
                                                          
1
 « A wetland should be considered internationally important if it regularly supports 1% of the 
individuals in a population of one species or subspecies of water bird » (Ramsar Convention 
Secretariat, 2004) 
« Similarly, the criteria for the identification of Key Biodiversity Areas (KBAs) use thresholds of 1% or 
5% of the species’ global population (depending on the type of species in question) to identify Key 
Biodiversity Areas (Langhammer et al. 2007). » (Temple 2012, Annexe 2 p63) 
2
 For instance : « The project is predicted to have a Net Positive Impact on 83/90 High Priority species, 
comprising a total of +1,256 UD (including like-for like species only) and +c. 1,750 UD (including like-
for-not-like High Priority species that are found in the offsets but not on the mine site)." (Temple et al., 
2012, p43) 
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the development of metrics. However current studies are following the lead of international 
organizations looking for ways to incorporate the concept (Business and Biodiversity Offsets 
Programme (BBOP), 2012c), particularly with a metric that allows the comparison of 
ecosystem services among different ecosystems. The mining companies and their 
consultants are also considering ways to add ecosystem services to the conventional 
indicators used in their offset calculations. 
Classical inventory type measures of biodiversity are being refined through the use of new 
algorithms that use a process of successive reductions allowing observers to condense the 
representation of an ecosystem into a few metrics (Latour, 2007 [1999]), thus facilitating the 
comparison of ecosystems and equivalence proposals. For insiders, terminology such as 
“net positive impact” is seen as a useful measure to convince corporate decision-makers of 
the advantages of considering biodiversity and the efficiency of metrics developed through 
simple but robust scientific arguments. How could a contemporary business manager not 
appreciate of the advantages of being able to demonstrate positive impact after many years 
of critical focus on the environmental degradation caused by extractive mining? 
 
5. Discussion 
Biodiversity offset mechanisms are rooted in new international practices of conservation, 
combining financial transfer and reduction of environmental pressures.  Standards are found 
similar to those of REDD+ (Angelsen, 2009; Karsenty, Vogel, & Castell, 2012; Lohmann, 
2009): 
(1) Classical measures used for new outputs (diameter at breast height to determine 
carbon tonnage in the case of REDD+, species inventory to determine species 
distribution units in the case of biodiversity offsets). 
(2) A unit metric facilitating demonstration of equivalence (carbon ton, quality hectare, 
habitat hectare). 
(3) Predictions of future positive impact of the project (avoided deforestation) based on 
estimation of actual losses (using prevailing annual deforestation rates as a baseline). 
(4) International experts who evaluate a project. The two cases presented here from 
Madagascar do not involve an international market mechanism and do not have 
access to any recognized system of certification such as for REDD+, but 
endorsement from the international scientific community is sought. 
(5) Demonstrated additionality. 
(6) The use of new technologies and particularly geographical information and remote 
Earth Observation systems. 
The REDD+ and biodiversity offsetting mechanisms emerged in the same decade (2000) and 
rest on the construction of scientific argumentation that is relatively similar in terms of 
methodology (baseline) and governance (international expertise), even though it does not 
focus on the same object (one on carbon, the other on biodiversity). 
Despite the similarities of the scientific argumentation, the implementation of the two 
mechanisms is very different, notably for local populations who may not view conservation 
NGOs and mining companies in the same light. In REDD+ projects, emitters from developed 
countries are paired with conservationists operating in southern countries, but in biodiversity 
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offset projects, the same company is implicated in both the degradation and the 
conservation. This apparent paradox is not well understood by local actors who are sceptical 
regarding forest conservation by mining companies. This is may be one reason why 
companies do not generally work alone on conservation programs but prefer to collaborate 
with conservation NGOs that bring legitimacy, technical expertise and experience in the field.  
Although both mechanisms aim to provide funding for conservation, the respective rationales 
are different. In REDD+ projects the beneficiary pays while a biodiversity offset project, is 
funded by the disturber (Boisvert, Meral, & Froger, 2013). 
Contrary to a REDD+ mechanism which already fits into the voluntary carbon market, 
biodiversity offsets are not market-based incentives in practice. Despite a frequent 
classification as market-based instruments for conservation and ecosystem services, we 
have not seen any market reference in the two biodiversity offset cases studied. This gap 
between discourse and practice in Payments for Environmental Services and biodiversity 
offsets has already been highlighted in the literature (Boisvert et al., 2013). 
Finally, despite the requirement additionality for REDD+ projects as well as for biodiversity 
offsets, both mechanisms are potentially developed on the same zones. This issue may 
apply to the two case studies: 
- The main offset zone of Ambatovy, the Ankerana protected area, is part of the CAZ 
corridor managed by CI who signed a 2008 agreement with the BioCarbonFund of 
the World Bank stipulating the purchase of 430 000 carbon credits for 1,5 million 
USD. This funding is currently being held, waiting for certification and a proposal for 
benefit sharing with the local community. Although the additionality question has been 
discussed between Ambatovy and CI, and Ambatovy will cover the percentage of the 
biocarbon finance attributable to Ankerana, without making claim itself about the 
Ankerana carbon (Andrew Cooke, personal comm.)  
- Rio Tinto has engaged IUCN experts for an economic valuation of ecosystem 
services from its offset sites. They wrote a document showing that the economic 
benefits of conservation of the « like-for-not-like » humid forest are particularly 
important in terms of carbon storage. The document identifies REDD+ as a potential 
mechanism to fund, at the same time, conservation management by Rio Tinto and 
the local people living around the forest (Olsen et al., 2011).  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
We have shown here that biodiversity offset strategies of two mining companies in a 
southern hemisphere country with high biodiversity are different but conceptually linked, and 
rest on past estimations and future predictions of land use changes. With scientific 
argumentation similar to REDD+ mechanisms, their calculations help to justify and validate 
the policy of certain mining companies to claim “no net loss” or “net positive impact” on 
biodiversity. 
We outlined two different but related scientific strategies of the mining companies, which rely 
on natural factors (characteristics of degraded and conserved ecosystems), and on 
institutional factors (choice of key collaborations to collect the data and help develop the 
main argumentation). These initiatives may not be complete solutions, but they allow for 
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better quantitative and qualitative ecosystem assessment and acknowledge and apply new 
standards developed by the international community on the value of biodiversity. They also 
encourage the development of funding mechanisms. 
Biodiversity offsets are not mandatory for these mining companies, but they are integrated 
into their respective investments, and supported with strategies that are contextual and 
diverse in terms of governance and development of scientific argumentation. As international 
initiatives like BBOP attempt to standardise the indicators and principles of offset programs, 
a sort of competitive race for biodiversity metrics further motivates firms to invest in this 
relatively recent concept, as a means of influencing international standards and perhaps reap 
advantages from leadership in the field. 
Beyond these scientific and institutional aspects, biodiversity offsetting represents a new 
mechanism that has the potential for mobilising resources over extended periods of time 
when compared with classical conservation projects developed by NGOs. But are those 
variables (funding and duration) decisive for the sustainability and efficiency of a 
conservation project? Will this mechanism largely change conservation schemes or become 
incorporated into the continuity of an assortment of actions? How will this mechanism take 
into account local populations near conservation zones who rely on natural resources for 
livelihood and may already live in very precarious conditions? 
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Annex: Summary of the main characteristics of the two firms 
Companies Ambatovy 
 
QMM (Qit  Madagascar 
Minerals) 
 
Investment 5.5 billion USD 931 millions USD 
Financial partnerships  
Dynatec Corporation (Canada), 
Sherritt Incorporated (Canada), 
Sumitomo Incorporated 
(Japan), Kores (Korea) and 
SNC Lavalin (Canada) 
80% Rio Tinto (Canada, 
Angleterre) / 20% Malagasy 
Government 
Ore 
Nickel, Cobalt and Ammonium 
Sulphate  
Ilmenite 
Annual taxes in 2012 USD 20 millions USD 19,8 millions 
Exploitation duration 29 40 to 50 
Start of exploration 1994 1986 
Feasibility and impact studies 
2003 1992 
Mining permit acquisition 2006 2001 
Start of exploitation 2010 2008 
First document on offsetting 
2009 2012 
Calculation methods 
Habitat Hectares Quality Hectares and Unity of 
Global Distribution 
Focus 
species, habitats, connectivity habitat, species 
Inspirations of the method 
BBOP and Victoria Australia Victoria Australia, Ramsar 
Convention 
Objective No Net Loss Net Positive Impact 
Type of compensation 
In-Kind Compensation and 
Financial Compensation 
In-Kind Compensation and 
Financial Compensation 
Construction  
port ; pipeline ; transformation 
factory 
port ; route 
Avoidance area 
21 different studied roads for 
pipeline  
1722ha 
Restoration area 
Ongoing planification 200 (for Mandena site) 
Reforestation area 
Ongoing planification 1800 (for Mandena site) 
Degraded forest area 1352,5 1665 
Offset area 27400 20000 
Offset area/degraded area 20 12 
Number of species (flora) 376 614 
Number of endangered species 
(flora) 
3 42 
Number of species () 201 ? 
Number of endemic species 
(fauna) 
? 12 
16 
 
Number of endangered species 
(fauna) 
15 ? 
lemurs 16 ? 
herpetofauna 123 96 
birds 62 77 
habitats 
3 types  of habitat and one at 
landscape level  
  
Partnership for offset writing 
Golder Associates, WCS, 
Ambatovy 
The Biodiversity Consultancy, 
IUCN, QMM 
Scientific partnerships (offset) 
MBG, WCS, BBOP The Biodiversity Consultancy, 
IUCN 
Management partnerships 
(offset) 
MBG, CI MBG, Asity 
Cost of offset 
Around US$ 300 000 for 
Ankerana site (with CI); More 
than one US$ million for flora 
conservation program around 
the mine (with MBG) ; more 
than US$ 250 000 to quantify 
losses and gains (with WCS) 
600000 for the 3 QMM sites + 
20000 to MBG in Mahabo +  ? 
Asity in TGK 
Scientific budget 560000 ? 
Budget for one hectare 35-44$ 150-1500 
Degraded ecosystem 
1336 ha of humid forest + 
216km of pipeline equivalent to 
16,5ha; Total loss : 1168 
habitat hectare 
Total loss : 428 quality 
hectare 
Biodiversity Offset 
1) 11600ha endangered forest 
off-site offset (with similar 
abiotic and biotic conditions), 2) 
2 on-site azonal forest habitats 
conservation, 3) 4900ha 
conservation forest area around 
the footprint, 4) Analamay-
Mantadia forest corridor, 5) 
Ramsar humid zone of 
Torotorofotsy, 6) Pipeline right 
of way reforestation, 7) mine 
footprint replacement forest 
Offset: Mahabo (like for like), 
Tsitongambarika (like for not 
like), Ste Luce (like for like), 
Avoidance: Petriky, Mandena 
et Ste Luce, Restoration : 
Petriky, Mandena and Ste 
Luce 
 
